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Beyond 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d): The Scope of
Congress's Power to Preserve Railroad
Rights-of-Way
Introduction
As early as 1968, Congress recognized the need to preserve railroad
rights-of-way to meet the nation's future transportation needs.2 The
need arose because of the pervasive abandonment of railroad lines.
Whereas in 1920 the nation's railroad system reached its peak of 272,000
miles, in 1990 only about 141,000 miles remained, and experts predicted
that 3,000 miles per year would continue to be abandoned through the
end of this century. 3 The National Trails System Ace is a current mani-
festation of the policy to preserve railroad rights-of-way. Part of the
Trails Act directs the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)5 to re-
frain from categorizing a railroad as "abandoned" if state and local agen-
cies or private interests wish to establish trails on the right-of-way and
the railroad owner assents to the trail establishment.6 This procedure is
popularly known as "interim trail use."'7
The railroad owners do not bring fifth amendment takings claims'
because no transfer of property rights is forced upon them by the Trails
Act, which requires the railroad owners' assent to interim use.9 The
1. A right-of-way, "in reference to a railway... is a mere easement in the lands of
others, obtained by lawful condemnation to public use or by purchase. It would be using the
term in an unusual sense, by applying it to an absolute purchase of the fee-simple of lands to be
used for a railway...." BLACK's LAW DIcToNARY 1489 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (emphasis in
original).
2. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. I.C.C., 850 F.2d 694, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
3. Preseault v. I.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 918, 914 (1990).
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1241-1251 (1988) [hereinafter Trails Act]. The right-of-way remains sub-
ject to ICC control. Id § 1247(d). This means that the ICC retains the power to regulate
future operations over the right-of-way.
5. The ICC is a federal "[c]ommission created by the Interstate Commerce Act ... to
carry out the measures therein enacted." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 955 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
The Act is "designed to regulate commerce between the states, and particularly the transporta-
tion of persons and property, by carriers, between interstate points ... ." Id4
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988).
7. Rail Abandonments-Use of Rights-of-Way as Trails, 2 I.C.C.2d 591 (1986).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[MNor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."
9. See, eg., Southern Pacific Transportation, Inc.-Abandonment Exemption-In El
Dorado County, Cal, No. AB-12, Sub-No. 128X, slip op. (I.C.C. July 16, 1990) (the Trails Act
"only permits voluntary interim trail use").
[907]
908 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:907
owners have an incentive to assent, because the interim use provision
frees the railroads from tax and tort liability.10 Trails Act litigation at
the appellate level has raised only the issue of whether the holder of a
reversionary interest in the right-of-way has a valid takings claim against
the federal government pursuant to a Trails Act transaction.11 Most
cases and commentators answer the question in the affirmative. 2
This Note argues that under prevailing Supreme Court doctrine,
Congress has the power to prevent indefinitely any property owner from
obstructing rights-of-way that the ICC deems necessary to the nation's
future transportation needs-whether the interests are held in fee or sub-
ject to future interests. The relevant congressional power is important
because it allows Congress to free the ICC from obtaining railroad own-
ers assent to interim use.1
3
Historical authority to preserve rights-of-way derives from two
sources, each of which uniquely avoids potential takings claims. One
source covers rights-of-way that Congress provided through land grants
during the nineteenth century.' 4 Railroad companies holding these
rights-of-way are subject to the qualified requirement that they "subserve
the public interests" in transportation.' 5 Preserving rights-of-way is an
apposite method of meeting the requirement. In this context, a grantee's
takings claim against the federal government must fail because the gov-
ernment retains the right to control the use and disposition of rights-of-
way if doing so helps meet national transportation needs.' 6
10. Rail Abandonments, 2 I.C.C.2d at 602-13.
11. See Preseault v. I.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 914, 924 n.9 (1990).
12. Id. at 926-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lawson v. State, 107 Wash. 2d 444, 730
P.2d 1308 (1986); McKinley v. Waterloo Railroad Co., 368 N.W.2d 131, 133-36 (Iowa 1985);
Comment, The Use of Discontinued Railroad Rights-of- Way as Recreational Hiking and Biking
Trail- Does the National Trails System Act Sanction Takings?, 33 ST. Louis U.LJ. 205
(1988); Cain, Unhappy Trails--Disputed Use of Railroad Rights-of-Way Under the National
Trails System Act, 5 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 211 (1989).
13. The owners' assent is not always forthcoming. See, eg., Southern Pacific Transporta-
tion, Inc.-Abandonment Exemption-In El Dorado County, Cal, No. AB-12, Sub-No. 128X,
Slip Op. (I.C.C. July 16, 1990) (Railroad declined to assent).
The ICC does not believe that it must wait for prospective trail operators (those who
control use of the trails) to assume property tax and tort liability for the rights-of-way in
question. Rather, 18 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988) "requires not that all interim trail users be sub-
ject to tort liability, but that the abandoning railroad be protected from liability if it retains its
interest in the right-of-way." Rail Abandonments, 2 I.C.C.2d at 608.
14. See T. Roar, RAILROAD LAND GRANTS FROM CANALS TO TRANSCONTiNENTALS
(1987) (this work cites numerous federal land grant statutes).
15. The relevant federal land grant statutes are applied in United States v. Denver & Rio
Grande Ry. Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 (1893); Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 683
(1979).
16. See, eg., Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 150 U.S. at 14-16 (federal grants are to receive
such a construction as to carry out the intent of Congress, and this intent should be ascertained
by looking to the condition of the country when the acts were passed, as well as to the purposes
declared on their face).
The second source of historical power to preserve "Railroad Rights-
of-way," though less familiar, reaches further than the federal land grant
source. The power derived from the second source is analogous to the
federal "navigation servitude" doctrine.17 This doctrine allows the fed-
eral government to keep navigable waterways passable, even at devastat-
ing expense to riparian landowners, without having to pay compensation
for takings claims.18 Though the historical roots of the navigation servi-
tude doctrine are questionable,19 its practical basis is the Commerce
Clause.2" Because the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate
other aspects of interstate railroading,2" an analog of the navigation ser-
vitude should apply also to the railroads' rights-of-way.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of railroad land grants and
the Supreme Court holdings that suggest federally granted rights-of-way
are subject to the federal government's plenary power to protect inter-
state commerce. Part H discusses the evolution of the navigation servi-
tude. This part also illustrates how the servitude should apply to
railroads and, to some extent, how courts already have applied the servi-
tude to railroads. An analog of the navigation servitude would nullify
takings claims in the area of railroad rights-of-way. Part III shows that
even under a conventional fifth amendment takings clause analysis, the
navigation servitude analog prevents takings claims against the federal
government in railroad rights-of-way cases. Part IV argues that the cur-
rent statutory method of preserving rights-of-way is poorly adapted to
the aforementioned authority.
I. An Implied Condition in Federal Land Grants for Railroads
Congress's earliest land grants to railroads served to promote settle-
ment of the nation's newly acquired lands.22 This narrow purpose may
have been justified by the physical dangers that accompanied early rail-
roading.2" Before long, "[r]ailroads provided a regular and speedy
method for transportation of volumes of people and goods not previously
17. See generally Note, Determining the Parameters of the Navigation Servitude Doctrine,
34 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1981). The Note explains that upon finding that waters are navigable,
the Court assumes that the waters may be taken for public use without compensation. Id
18. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For the practical basis analysis, see infra notes 51-52
and accompanying text.
21. See, eg., Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981)
(abandonments); Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924) (rates); Penn-
sylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 351 (1915) (interchange of cars).
22. T. ROoT, supra note 14, at 4.
23. See id. at 11. Whether Congress had other reasons for limiting the grants is beyond
the scope of this Note.
Less hazardous means of transportation, particularly canals and roads, received most of
the early land grants. Id
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achieved."'24 By the time of the Pacific railroad grants,25 congressional
policy favored railroad development "as the primary component of a
transcontinental transportation system' 26 that would serve not only the
needs of frontier settlers but the needs of the military and the postal ser-
vice.27 Thus, the point of the federal railroad land grants was not to help
the railroads but to help their customers. The last federal railroad
grants, 28 in contrast to the earlier grants, 29 provided only enough land
for the rights-of-way and adjacent structures necessary to operate the
railroads.3" The change occurred because the railroad companies were
slow in selling the surrounding lands to homesteaders. 3'
Because Congress favored transportation generally rather than the
railroads specifically, Supreme Court cases favor a conclusion that the
government has retained an interest in the property sufficient to protect
future commerce.32 Government grants to private parties should be nar-
rowly construed against the grantee. 3 The Court applies this rule when
so construing the grant will serve the particular public advantage that
Congress intended to promote.34 For example, the Court has held that
the continued use of a right-of-way for railroad purposes was an implied
condition of a railroad land grant.35 The need for present and future
transportation is no less than the need at the time of the original land
grants particularly given the nation's great increase in population since
the time of the original land grants.36 Accordingly, the government still
holds one stick "in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
24. Id at 10 (footnote omitted).
25. The Pacific railroad grants promoted the building of transcontinental railroads. Con-
gress made the grants from 1850 to 1871. T. RooT, supra note 14, at 42.
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 22.
28. Grants made near 1872, when Congress made its last grant to a railroad. Id. at 25.
29. Grants occurring prior to the late 1860s, when the political environment began to
disfavor granting large amounts of land to railroads. Id. at 23-24.
30. Id
31. Id at 23-24.
32. This is not to say that the railroads actually owe the government land grant repay-
ments in the form of transportation; Congress itself has relinquished any such claim. Wilner,
History and Evolution of Railroad Land Grants, 48 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 687, 693-96 (1981).
33. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prod. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978).
34. United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 150 U.S. 1 (1893); cf Leo Sheep Co.
v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682-83 (1979), which held that a federal railroad land grant was
not resolved for the government when the federal government claimed that an implied ease-
ment existed across land that was originally granted to the Union Pacific Railroad. The de-
clared purpose of the grant was to subsidize construction of a transcontinental railroad. Since
the alleged easement would only have allowed non-railroad access to a public reservoir area, it
was inconsistent with the declared purpose of the grant.
35. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903).
36. For example, in enacting the Trails Act, Congress clearly intended to preserve as
many transportation corridors as possible as an important national resource. See H.R. REP.
No. 28, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1983).
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as property,"37 in effect the right to protect commerce. If the govern-
ment is merely preserving its own property interest, railroads can make
no valid claim under the Takings Clause.38
II. Applicability of the Navigation Servitude Doctrine
A. History of the Doctrine
The origin of the navigation servitude doctrine39 is unclear. The
doctrine is coextensive with the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States.' The jurisdiction apparently flows from the United States' sover-
eign property interest in navigable waters. 1 The cases that describe the
navigation servitude as a property interest, however, rely heavily on the
federal government's power to regulate commerce.42 As this section will
show, these lines of reasoning may be reconciled under the theory that
government exercise of the commerce power to keep existing transporta-
tion routes open can never give rise to a claim under the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
History provides the best starting point for this analysis. In the
1851 case of The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,43 the Supreme
Court held that admiralty jurisdiction applies to all navigable waters in
the United States.' The case concerned the collision of a steamboat and
a sailboat on Lake Ontario, 4 far from tidal waters. As a preliminary
matter, the Court was confronted with the fact that its prior decisions,
following the English cases, had extended admiralty jurisdiction only to
tidal waters." Chief Justice Taney asserted that admiralty jurisdiction
nevertheless extended to Lake Ontario and all other navigable waters in
the United States because
37. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
38. As much is clear from the language of the Takings Clause itself. That is, if the rail-
road owns a right-of-way subject to the federal power to protect commerce, the federal govern-
ment has "taken" nothing when it asserts this power. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. For a general discussion of the doctrine, see Note, supra note 17. See also Trelease,
Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALO L. REv. 399, 400 (1961) (The "naviga-
tion servitude" is the power to control navigation and navigable waters. It includes the power
to destroy navigability, to prevent navigation, to generate electricity even where navigability is
impaired, and to protect navigable capacity by preventing diversion of water, obstruction by
bridges, dams, or flood control measures in tributaries or watersheds).
40. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Devel-
opment, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 513, 588-93, 595-96 (1975).
41. See infra discussion accompanying notes 61-71.
42. See infra discussion accompanying notes 73-97.
43. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
44. Id. at 457.
45. Id. at 450.
46. MacGrady, supra note 40, at 569 n.304.
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[i]n England... there was no navigable stream in the country
beyond the ebb and flow of the tide .... In England, therefore,
tide-water and navigable water are synonymous terms, and tide
water... meant nothing more than public rivers, as contradistin-
guished from private ones; and they took the ebb and flow of the
tide as the test, because it was a convenient one, and more easily
determined the character of the river.4 7
Legal scholarship has shown that the factual and legal premises be-
hind Chief Justice Taney's reasoning are flawed. Specifically,
it is not true that tidewaters and navigable waters in England were
factually and legally equivalent .... [M]any nontidal streams in
England were (and are) navigable in fact. As early as Glanville (c.
1187) the obstruction of "public" streams was recognized to be a
purpresture. Apparently, the streams in England, both tidal and
nontidal, were being choked by kydells, weirs, and other fishing
devices; and originally the complaint voiced against kydells, many
of which were located in nontidal streams, was they interfered with
navigation.48
Admiralty jurisdiction in England was limited to tidal waters by a
1389 statute, largely because English admiralty courts had usurped juris-
diction over inland "business and profits" that the common law and local
courts had previously enjoyed.49 Moreover, Chief Justice Taney's broad
interpretation of admiralty jurisdiction conflicted with Supreme Court
precedent, which had held appropriately that admiralty jurisdiction was
limited to tidal waters.50
Why did Chief Justice Taney so broadly construe the constitutional
grant of admiralty jurisdiction? In a word, commerce. Today, "[i]n
cases dealing with navigability[,] the Supreme Court indiscriminately
cites cases from the areas of admiralty, commerce clause regulation, and
submerged bed ownership-often, it seems, without realizing it."51 The
tests for these identified areas of control center around navigability-in-
fact. 52 The similarity of the tests was warranted from the start because a
primary goal of the Constitution was to promote commerce among the
states.53 Commerce was a central concern of the Genesee Chief Court.5"
Because Lake Ontario lay far inland, the need for transportation in the
47. Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 454-55.
48. MacGrady, supra note 40, at 571 (footnotes omitted).
49. Id at 577.
50. Id at 569 n.304 (citing Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847); The Steam-
boat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175 (1837); Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324
(1833); The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825)).
51. Id at 587 n.401.
52. Id at 587-96.
53. See, eg., Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 470 (1874) ("No doubt
commerce by water was principally in the minds of those who framed and adopted the Consti-
tution, although both its language and spirit embrace commerce by land as well.").
54. Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 454:
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growing nation gave rise to federal regulation in areas unforeseen when
the original Constitution was signed."5 Specifically, canals and roads had
pushed their way far beyond the tidewaters by the early 1800s, and com-
merce along inland rivers was similarly on the upswing.5 6 Regulation of
commerce was in order, but existing jurisdictional doctrine did not yet
allow the Court to exercise fully its commerce clause power:
the conviction that this definition of admiralty powers was nar-
rower than the Constitution contemplated, has been growing
stronger every day with the growing commerce on the lakes and
navigable rivers of the western States. And the difficulties which the
language and decisions of this court had thrown in the way, of
extending it to these waters, have perhaps led to the inquiry
whether the law in question could not be supported under the
power granted to Congress to regulate commere .... [But the]
extent of the judicial power is carefully defined and limited, and
Congress cannot enlarge it to suit even the wants of commerce ....
If this law, therefore, is constitutional, it must be supported on the
ground that the lakes and navigable waters connecting them are
within the scope of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as known
and understood in the United States when the Constitution was
adopted.57
Thus the needs of commerce gave Chief Justice Taney reason to take
a position inconsistent with fact and law.
Genesee Chief addressed admiralty jurisdiction, not the federal gov-
ernment's authority to keep navigable waterways open. This authority
arises from the navigation servitude doctrine.5" The connection between
the two concepts is that the Court's commerce-oriented explanation of
Genesee Chief, taken with the navigation servitude cases,5 9 supports the
conclusion that the navigation servitude doctrine is rooted in the Com-
merce Clause.
Some cases suggest that the navigation servitude, as its name im-
plies, is a proprietary grant of an interest originally held by the United
States.' The proprietary grant theory finds support in a line of Supreme
Court cases that describe navigable waters subject to the Commerce
The union is formed upon the basis of equal rights among all the States .... That
equality does not exist, if the commerce on the lakes and on the navigable waters of
the West are denied the benefits of the same courts and the same jurisdiction for its
protection which the Constitution secures to the States bordering on the Atlantic.
55. For a view of the expanding scope of the federal commerce power, compare Railroad
Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456 (1874), with Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois,
118 U.S. 557 (1886).
56. See J. STOVER, AMERiCAN RAILROADS 1-10 (1961).
57. Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 451-53 (emphasis added).
58. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
59. See supra notes 61-109 and accompanying text.
60. Cf R. EPSTEIN, TAINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN 68 (1985) ('The government is not vested ipso facto with any rights at all.").
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Clause as "public property of the nation. '61 Gilman v. Philadelphia62
was the first case in which the Court described navigable waters in this
way. In Gilman, the Court refused to enjoin Philadelphia's building of a
bridge across a tidal, navigable river.63 Yet the Court left intact Con-
gress's authority to prevent such a bridge from being built."4 In dicta,
the Court described the source of this authority as follows:
Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce
comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent neces-
sary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are
accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For this
purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to
all requisite legislation by Congress. This necessarily includes the
power to keep them open and free from any obstructions to their
navigation, interposed by the States or otherwise; to remove such
obstructions when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as
they may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil and for
the punishment of offenders. For these purposes, Congress pos-
sesses all the powers which existed in the States before the adop-
tion of the national Constitution, and which have always existed in
the Parliament in England. 6
The Gilman Court cited no authority for its history of the "public
property" interest. However, Martin v. Waddel166 discusses the public
property doctrine's origin. First, at English common law the Court noted
that the "dominion and property in navigable waters, and in the lands
under them, [were] held by the king as a public trust."'67 Then, as the
Court stated, "when the Revolution took place, the people of each state
became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own
common use ... ."68 The Court said that a sufficient property interest
was nevertheless reserved to Congress to keep the waterways open to
navigation.69
Genesee Chief90 is in accord, stating that "[i]f the water was naviga-
ble it was deemed to be public .... "71 Yet as noted earlier, the decision
was rooted in the need for commerce, whereas the property concept was
61. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 725 (1865); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1870); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586 (1895); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,
223 U.S. 605, 634 (1912); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 63 (1913).
62. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
63. Id. at 732.
64. Id at 731.
65. Id at 724-25 (footnote omitted).
66. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
67. Id at 411.
68. Id at 410.
69. Id
70. 53 U.S. (12 How. 443 (1851); see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
71. Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 457.
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a tool for circumventing the limits of common law admiralty jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the historical approach is suspect. Indeed,
there was virtually no support for such a doctrine in English com-
mon law at the time of the American Revolution-or even when
Chief Justice Taney was writing in 1842. Moreover, the sub-
merged bed doctrine ultimately adopted by the English courts after
•.. 1868... was not a substantive rule of absolute Crown owner-
ship; it was an evidentiary rule of prima facie Crown ownership.
Thus the public trust doctrine, though purportedly rooted in old
English soil, is an American invention, stemming from the creative
misconceptions of [Chief Justice] Taney.7 2
It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court later used the
navigation servitude under a commerce rationale.73 The 1913 case of
Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs provides a prime illus-
tration of this point.74 Blue Point sought to restrain the defendant,
Briggs, from dredging along the Great South Bay in New York because
"the dredging of such a channel would destroy the oysters of the plaintiff,
not only along the line of the excavation, but for some distance on either
side, and greatly impair the value of his leasehold for oyster cultiva-
tion."'75 Blue Point's leasehold was based on "royal patents made when
the state of New York was a colonial dependency of Great Britain. 7 6
The lower court, however, had held that Blue Point's title was qualified,
and subject to Congress's righi to deepen the channel for navigation.77
On appeal, Blue Point claimed that a taking had occurred for which
compensation was due under the Fifth Amendment.78
The Court rejected Blue Point's takings claim, holding that
[w]hatever power the several States had before the Union was
formed, over the navigable waters within their several jurisdictions,
has been delegated to the Congress, in which, therefore, is centered
all of the governmental power over the subject, restricted only by
such limitations as are found in other clauses of the Constitution
.... The plaintiff in error has, therefore, no such private property
right which, when taken, or incidentally destroyed by the dredging
of a deep water channel across it, entitles him to demand compen-
sation as a condition.79
72. Macgrady, supra note 40, at 610-11.
73. In this context, In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586 (1895) directly connects the "public
property" language of Gilman with the broader "duty of keeping... highways of interstate
commerce free from obstruction, for it has always been recognized as one of the powers and
duties of a government to remove obstructions from the highways under its control." Debs
applies this "duty" to railroads.
74. 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
75. Id. at 85.
76. Id. at 86.
77. Id. at 85.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 87-88.
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The Lewis Court's analysis is problematic because the navigation servi-
tude doctrine lacks support in historical fact." Although Lewis implies
that the Commerce Clause memorializes the conveyance of the naviga-
tion servitude from the states to the United States,81 the historical insuffi-
ciency of the navigation servitude suggests that states had nothing to
convey in the first place.82
The Court's interpretation is justified in light of the nature of the
property interest supposedly conveyed by the states. A key case in this
area is Shively v. Bowlby. 3 Shively concerned a dispute over title to sub-
merged lands under the Columbia River. Shively claimed title through
the United States, while Bowlby claimed title through the State of Ore-
gon." In the process of holding that Bowlby's grant took precedence, 5
the Court asserted that waters affected by the tide, and the lands under
them, "[b]y the common law... are public in their nature, for highways
of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose
of fishing by all the King's subjects."8 6 This characterization conflicts
with Lewis. In Lewis, Blue Point was "fishing," a fact that demanded the
Court's attention. 7 The Lewis Court conceded that "[t]he cultivation of
oysters... has become an industry of great importance,"8 8 but it ignored
the effects this fact might have on the question whether the federal gov-
ernment must make some allowance for the continuance of fishing.89
Whereas Shively did not prioritize fishing and commerce, Lewis favored
commerce to the exclusion of fishing--even though the right to fish in
public waters had been a distinct property interest under Shively.9°
80. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
81. "Whatever power the several states had before the Union was formed, over the navi-
gable waters within their several jurisdictions, has been delegated to the Congress .... ." Lewis,
229 U.S. at 87-88.
82. The Court nevertheless currently subscribes to the dubious property interest interpre-
tation of the navigation servitude. See, eg., United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700,
704-05 (1987) ("[In Lewis... [the Court] observed that [petitioner's] very title to the sub-
merged lands 'is acquired and held subject to the power of Congress to deepen the water
... ".' ') (quoting Lewis, 229 U.S. at 88).
83. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
84. Id at 9.
85. Id at 58.
86. Id at 11.
87. See Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472, 489-90 (1854):
In all the treatises respecting that common right [of fishery], the general term "pis-
caria," or its equivalent, is used as including all fisheries, without any regard to their
distinctive character, or to the method of taking the fish .... Shell fisheries have ever
been regarded as a part of the public fisheries of England ....
88. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 86 (1913).
89. See United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 704 (1987) ('The application of
these [navigation servitude] principles to interference with streambed interests has not de-
pended on balancing this valid public purpose [the servitude] in light of the intended use of
those interests by the [riparian] owner.").
90. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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Realistically, the "public property" analysis is a red herring because
the Court simply gives the Commerce Clause priority over the Takings
Clause-at least where navigation is concerned. In fact, in 1956 the
Supreme Court admitted that "[t]he interest of the United States in the
flow of a navigable stream originates in the Commerce Clause. That
clause speaks in terms of power, not property. But the power is a domi-
nant one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any competing or
conflicting one." 91
More recently, Kaiser Aetna v. United States92 laid the "public prop-
erty" rationale to rest. The Court held that a taking occurred where the
federal government deprived the owner of a privately developed marina
of the right to exclude the public from its waters. 93 In so holding, the
Court pointed to the numerous non-navigational areas in which it had
affirmed congressional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.94
Today's Court merely views the navigation servitude as "an expres-
sion of the notion that the determination whether a taking has occurred
must take into consideration the important public interest in the flow of
interstate waters that in their natural condition are in fact capable of
supporting public navigation." 95 The Court views the navigation servi-
tude's origin as constitutional because the servitude "exists by virtue of
the Commerce Clause.... " 96 Accordingly, the Kaiser Aetna court said
in dicta that the power to "[remove] obstructions to navigation" would
not give rise to a takings claim if imposed on the private owners of the
marina, even though the Court found a taking when the government
used its commerce power to deprive the owners of "the right to exclude
others." '9
7
Even though the Court may have abandoned the public property
rationale, determining how public property entitlement had expanded
prior to Kaiser Aetna provides some insight into the navigation servi-
tude's applicability in other areas.
Professor Epstein9" argues that an original property interest in navi-
gable waters would entitle the government to maintain the status quo
ante, to "without compensation enjoin activities by riparians that reduce
the ease of passage along navigable rivers ... .99 Epstein, however, also
91. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956).
92. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
93. Id at 179-80.
94. Id at 174 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (labor);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (manufacture); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (agriculture)).
95. Id at 175.
96. Id at 177.
97. Id at 174-76.
98. R. EPsTEIN, supra note 60.
99. Id at 70.
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observes"° that the Court did not require the government to compensate
the owner of a hydroelectric power plant situated on a navigable portion
of a river, when the government raised the water level so as to render the
plant inoperable.10 1 Because hydroelectric power was unimagined in the
eighteenth century, this holding upsets not only the status quo ante, but
expands the original entitlement. As the Supreme Court later expressed,
"It is not true... that only structures in the bed of a navigable stream
which obstruct or adversely affect navigation may be injured or destroyed
without compensation by a federal improvement of navigable capac-
ity." 102 Of important note is that the government did not deprive the
plant owner of title-it merely interfered with the owner's ability to use
its property. This is precisely what occurred in Lewis.1"3
The "use" exception to the Fifth Amendment appears to have
originated in Transportation Co. v. Chicago,1 in which the plaintiff
owned a dock and wharfing rights and privileges on the Chicago River.
The government constructed a dam which made it impossible for the
plaintiff "to bring its boats up to the dock or to land freight and passen-
gers thereat."105 Moreover, the excavation "greatly damaged and in-
jured the warehouse."'"1 6 Despite the seriousness of the plaintiff's
injuries, the Court held them to be damnum absque injuria:'°7 "acts
done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly
encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may im-
pair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of
the [Fifth Amendment]."10 8 Transportation Company concerned a per-
missible restriction on the use of property. This restriction must be dis-
tinguished from limitations on other incidents of property ownership,
which may well violate the Takings Clause.' 0 9 Restricting the use of
property is the only exercise of governmental power on which this Note
focuses.
100. Id. at 71.
101. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
102. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. Ry., 312 U.S. 592, 599 (1940) (em-
phasis added).
103. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
104. 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
105. Id. at 636.
106. Id.
107. "Damnum absque injuria: Loss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense."
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 354 (5th ed. 1979).
108. Transportation Co., 99 U.S. at 642.
109. For example, the Court has held, in the maritime context, that eliminating the right to
exclude others gave rise to a Takings claim. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-
80 (1980) (taking occurred where government deprived owner of privately developed marina of
the right to exclude others).
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B. Applying the Navigation Servitude
The governmental powers contained in the navigation servitude doc-
trine should not apply exclusively to navigable waters, because these
powers rest on the commerce power rather than on notions of public
property. The navigation servitude is merely a means of expressing the
dominance of the Commerce Clause over the Takings Clause.'10 The
term naturally came about in the context of navigation because that was
a prevalent mode of transportation when the Court decided Gilman."'
In 1865, there were few interstate railroads to which a navigation servi-
tude analog could have applied. American railroad construction had not
begun in earnest until the 1830s,112 and the first transcontinental railroad
was not completed until four years after Gilman.' 3 The transcontinental
railroads became more important in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury when the "canal era" drew to a close. 14 Further, railroads never
required the evolution of an analogous servitude doctrine because they
could protect their own interests in maintaining their rights-of-way.115
This situation gave rise to few cases in which landowners' rights con-
fficted with the needs of interstate commerce.1 16 Of course, the state and
federal governments have regulated railroads since the late nineteenth
century, but the need for such regulation arose largely with regard to
rates.1 17 In this context, the Court may view applying a navigation servi-
tude analog to railroads as mere regulation, which would not amount to
a taking.1 18
The word "navigation" is significant only because the physical pa-
rameters of the navigation servitude doctrine depend on whether the wa-
terway in question meets the test of navigability. 1 9 Thus, legal theory
does not impede the Court's application of the servitude doctrine to rail-
roads. The test of "navigability" is simply analogous to the question of
how wide a corridor Congress must preserve in order to protect future
110. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. Ry., 312 U.S. 592, 596-99 (1941)
(government may exercise the navigation servitude to the exclusion of takings claims, even if
doing so does not further navigation); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
111. See T. RoOT, supra note 14, at 6-9.
112. See . STOVER, supra note 56, at 19, 22-23.
113. Id at 74.
114. See T. RooT, supra note 14, at 42-43.
115. Of course, some railroads received states' financial assistance for this purpose. . STo-
VER, supra note 56, at 30-31.
116. Cf Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (no taking occurred
where the operation of a recently constructed railway caused the value of adjacent property to
fall).
117. See Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad
Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1988).
118. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); see also infra notes 141-45 and
accompanying text.
119. See Note, supra note 17.
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railroad operations. The commerce clause issue presents no problem be-
cause the Commerce Clause indisputably applies to interstate railroad
operations. 120
Given that the Commerce Clause applies to railroads, the constitu-
tional prioritization may take place in the context of railroad rights-of-
way. Specifically, a titleholder of a right-of-way, or of the estate sub-
servient to the right-of-way, would have no takings clause claim if the
government deprived the titleholder of the right to use the property in a
manner inconsistent with future railroad use. The titleholder would be
in precisely the same position as was the plaintiff in Lewis.12 ' Nor could
the titleholder argue that the government failed to provide notice of the
servitude prior to the commencement of railroad use on the rights-of-way
in question. Original owners of many submerged estates did not have
government notice of the navigation servitude, yet the Court has not hes-
itated to apply it to these cases.
1 22
The Court has deemed that constructive notice of navigation servi-
tude restrictions flows from the Commerce Clause.1 23 The Commerce
Clause applies with no less force to railroads than to navigable water-
ways." 4 There is little need to draw a parallel between railroads and
navigation because "a wide spectrum of economic activities 'affect' inter-
state commerce and thus are susceptible of congressional regulation
under the Commerce Clause irrespective of whether navigation, or, in-
deed, water, is involved."
1 25
Thus, the navigation servitude doctrine demands that the Com-
merce Clause should take precedence over the Takings Clause where the
need to keep paths of interstate commerce open is at stake. Railroad
rights-of-way are paths of interstate commerce, since railroads have tra-
ditionally been the subject of commerce clause regulation. Yet as Part
III will show, the Commerce Clause need not occupy such a prominent
place in the analysis.
III. Claims Under Conventional Takings Theory
Even under conventional takings theory, owners of railroad rights-
of-way or of the estates subservient to rights-of-way would have no tak-
ings clause claim. For present purposes, "conventional" theory is the
theory the Supreme Court has developed to interpret the Takings Clause
without applying the navigation servitude. The Commerce Clause, how-
ever, remains relevant to the conventional analysis.
120. See Baltimore & 0. Ry. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146 (1953).
121. For the facts of Lewis, see supra notes 74-78, and accompanying text.
122. Lewis, 229 U.S. 82 (1913); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
123. See United States v. Union Bridge Co., 143 F. 377, 390-94 (W.D. Pa. 1906).
124. See Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 323.
125. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979).
The Court has "been unable to develop any 'set formula' for deter-
mining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused
by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."' 26 This section deals
separately with three of the Court's major formulae. The first formula
determines whether the government's right-of-way preservation would be
a "taking per se, ' 127 the second formula addresses whether the preserva-
tion is the kind of zoning for which compensation is unnecessary,12 and
the third formula examines whether a property owner would have a
property interest worthy of protection under the Fifth Amendment.12 9
A. Takings Per Se
The first formula is that of "takings per se." 130 When governmental
action entails an intrusion and a permanent physical occupation of prop-
erty,"' a taking is deemed to have occurred. 13 2 An easement may consti-
tute a taking per se, at least when it is a public easement. 133 Thus in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,3 4 the Court held that a taking
would occur if the government, in order to create access to the ocean,
created a public easement through a beachfront landowner's property.1 35
Preserving railroad rights-of-way involves neither invasion nor oc-
cupation. To the contrary, it involves maintenance of the status quo.
Such preservation does create an easement in favor of the public, but it is
akin to a negative easement.136 Nollan concerned a public easement that
126. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
127. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
128. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
129. There are differing opinions concerning just what the "formulae" are. This Note does
not necessarily cover all of them but concerns itself with those most relevant to the question
whether owners of railroad rights-of-way, and the estates subservient to those rights-of-way,
can bring takings clause claims when the federal government seeks to keep the rights-of-way
open to future transportation use. For a different formulation concerning different facts, see
Brownstein, The Takings Clause and the Iranian Claims Settlement, 29 UCLA L. REv. 984,
1017-73 (1982).
130. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426. The "per se" language actually appears in the dissent. Id. at
442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. See Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985) ("He [Madison] intended the clause to
apply only to direct, physical taking of property by the federal government.").
132. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (law requiring a landowner to allow cable television lines to
be installed on the landowners apartment building was a compensable taking per se).
133. A public easement is one in which the right to enjoyment is vested in the public gener-
ally or in an entire community. BLACK's LAW DIcnroNARY 488 (5th ed. 1979).
134. 483 U.S. 825 (1989).
135. Id. at 831-32.
136. A negative easement exists when the owner of the servient estate is prohibited from
doing something otherwise lawful upon his estate because it will affect the dominant estate.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 133, at 488.
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upset the status quo.137
The "per se" category should not apply to negative easements in the
status quo, because the history of the Takings Clause limits it chiefly to
departures from the status quo ante. The original just compensation re-
quirements appeared in state constitutions in apparent response to state
legislatures' expropriation of an individual citizen's title to and use of
property, particularly for the building of roads.138  Thus landowners
could expect compensation when the state actually took their prop-
erty.139 But preservation of railroad rights-of-way is not an equivalent
situation, it is the preservation of the status quo ante. In other words,
preserving railroad rights-of-way is regulation, which speaks to the zon-
ing formula."4
B. Zoning
The second formula is that of zoning. Agins v. City of Tiburon is the
leading case supporting this theory.14 The A gins appellants had ac-
quired five acres of unimproved land in Tiburon, California.142 The City
of Tiburon then enacted a zoning ordinance that prevented the appellants
from building more than five single-family residences on their tract.143
The appellants claimed that a taking had occurred because the unusually
high value of the land was "completely destroyed." 1" The Court, how-
ever, held that Tiburon's zoning did not give rise to a taking because it
substantially advanced legitimate state interests and did not deny the ap-
pellants legitimate use of the land. 45 A right-of-way preservation statute
would arguably meet the Agins requirements.
The preservation of railroad rights-of-way substantially advances
the legitimate state interest of protecting commerce. If the legitimate
state interest requirement means anything, it must include interests em-
bodied in the Constitution. If the term "substantial" means anything, it
must include interests worthy of mention in the Constitution. Since the
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to protect commerce by regulat-
137. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32. For a discussion of the importance of the status quo, see
R. EPSTEIN, supra note 60, at 70-73.
138. Note, supra note 131, at 698.
139. Id
140. See infra notes 141-172, and accompanying text. A similar form of regulation is that
of forcing a railroad to maintain operations on a line. Such an action does not give rise to a
takings claim unless the railroad is losing money overall. See Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v.
Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981).
141. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
142. Id at 257.
143. IM.
144. Id at 258.
145. Id at 260.
ing railroads, 146 the first requirement of Agins merely describes another
facet of the commerce power.
The second test of Agins, legitimate use of land, can be met in a
manner consistent with future railroad operations while still providing
income to landowners. For example, in urban areas, local governments
may wish to use the railroad rights-of-way for transit purposes 47 or for
public passage.1 4 8 Under present law, municipalities may take the latter
option in exchange for relieving the railroads of tort and tax liability. 49
The railroad owner could make more money using the property for hous-
ing developments, but Agins does not demand that the state allow the
landowner to make the most profitable use of the land. 150
If the landowner is a railroad company, it cannot bring a valid tak-
ings claim even if the government denies the railroad company the op-
portunity to make the most profitable use of its rights-of-way. Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York15 1 held that no takings
claim arose from a zoning requirement that prohibited alterations to
Grand Central Terminal in New York City, even though altering it
would have made the property more profitable than its sole use as a rail
terminal.1 52 New York City, acting out of concern for the preservation
of historical structures, had adopted a Landmarks Preservation Law.15 3
The city applied the law to Grand Central Terminal, which was owned
by Penn Central Transportation Company.' The city's application of
the statute precluded Penn Central from building an office building atop
the existing terminal structure.15 5 The statute, however, granted "devel-
opment transfer rights,"' 56 which allowed Penn Central to transfer to
nearby buildings whatever air rights would have been available on the
Grand Central property. Penn Central owned several other buildings in
the midtown Manhattan area, at least eight of which were eligible to
receive development rights denied the terminal by virtue of the designa-
tion.15 7 Penn Central nevertheless argued that a taking of its air rights
146. See, eg., Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981)
(Commerce Clause allows Congress to grant the Interstate Commerce Commission plenary
power over railroad abandonments).
147. For example, the Los Angeles Regional Transit District has proposed paving over at
least one former rail line to run buses. Baden, Editorails, FLIMSIES, Mar. 11, 1991, at 21.
148. Especially as bicycle paths. See also Rail Abandonments-Use of Rights-of-Way as
Trails, 2 I.C.C.2d 591 (1986).
149. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988).
150. For a broad reading of the Takings Clause in the context of railroads, see Gibbons v.
United States, 660 F.2d 1227, 1238 n.19 (7th Cir. 1981).
151. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
152. Id. at 122-35.
153. Id at 108-09.
154. Id. at 115.
155. Id. at 116.
156. Id. at 114.
157. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115.
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above the terminal had occurred.15
The Court denied the takings claim in part because Penn Central
could not "establish a 'taking' simply by showing that they have been
denied the ability to exploit a single property interest that they heretofore
had believed was available for development."'5 9 Rather, the Court fo-
cused "both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole."'16
In the Penn Central context, it is useful to view the right-of-way as
part of "a whole," the larger piece of property that is the whole railroad
system. Various rights-of-way of a railroad are at least as interrelated as
are various property interests associated with a single building. The
Court has sanctioned aggregate treatment of the nation's railroads in the
context of rate regulation.1 61 Under this aggregate theory, no taking oc-
curs unless the entire railroad system operates at a loss.
For example, in Gibbons v. United States, 62 the ICC had ordered
the bankrupt Rock Island railroad to maintain rail service.163 The Sev-
enth Circuit held that directing Rock Island to provide rail service did
not constitute a taking even though it delayed Rock Island's sale of its
own property, because "this postponement involves no recognizable loss
to the defaulting carrier because the government is at the same time sub-
sidizing the discharge of the carrier's public service obligation through
directed service."'"
In a more practical context, if the right-of-way is surrounded by
separately owned, developed parcels, few legitimate uses-indeed, few
uses at all-will exist apart from transportation, including rail use. This
situation exists because railroad rights-of-way are often too narrow to
accommodate ordinary buildings or to allow access to them. But if the
right-of-way is surrounded by separately owned, undeveloped parcels,
the narrow strip of land constituting the right-of-way would hardly be a
magnet for transportation-impeding structures. Finally, if the right-of-
way is part of a larger parcel under single ownership, Agins is precisely
on point because it held that building restrictions on a substantial portion
of the tract in question did not give rise to a taking. 165
Does the Commerce Clause speak to whether land use is "legiti-
mate"? The Supreme Court suggested an affirmative answer in Richards
v. Washington Terminal Co. 166 The Richards plaintiffs, landowners adja-
158. Id at 122, 130.
159. Id at 130.
160. Id at 130-31 (emphasis added).
161. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924).
162. 660 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir. 1981).
163. Id at 1236-38.
164. Id at 1238.
165. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 257 (1980).
166. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
cent to a recently constructed railway, brought a takings claim against
the federal government based on diminished value of land because of rail-
way operations. 167 The land value had fallen because of the railroad op-
erations.16 A parcel adjacent to a tunnel had become valueless because
exhaust gases from the tunnel were pumped directly onto plaintiff's
land. 16
9
The Court held that a takings claim could be based only on the
property adjacent to the tunnel. 7 ' The other property could not form
the basis of a takings claim because operating a railroad would become
impossible if the railroad had to bear the costs of numerous takings
claims. 7' The Richards Court's rationale applies with equal force to the
preservation of railroad rights-of-way because it is unlikely that a right-
of-way would be rendered valueless solely because of a requirement that
it remain in its current state.'72 The cost of purchasing rights-of-way,
especially through developed areas, would be so immense that preserving
existing rights-of-way may b e the only economically feasible way in
which the government can meet future mass transportation needs.
C. Uncertain Property Interests
The third formula addresses whether the property interest itself was
uncertain from the outset. The property interest becomes uncertain
when constitutional interests would be served by a court's finding that no
taking had occurred. For example, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group"' held that the federal Price-Anderson Act, 74
which limited the right to recover damages for nuclear accidents, did not
give rise to a takings claim.'75 The Court held that Congress had limited
potential liability to encourage the private sector to participate in the
development of nuclear power.'76 Although the Court did not empha-
size the Commerce Clause, preserving the nation's power grid is surely a
legitimate area for congressional regulation under the Commerce
167. Id at 548-51.
168. Id at 549-50.
169. Id: at 550.
170. Id at 556-58.
171. Id at 553-55. The Court later applied this rationale to air transportation. In United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Court held that although low flights over private
property gave rise to a takings claim, high flights would not impinge upon private property
interests because the "doctrine... that at common law ownership of the land extended to the
periphery of the universe... has no place in the modem world. The air is a public highway, as
Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the
operator to countless trespass suits." Id at 260-61.
172. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
173. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
175. 438 U.S. at 84.
176. Id. at 63-66.
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The contravening constitutional interest need not be the protection
of commerce. This point is illustrated by Dames & Moore v. Regan. 7 '
The Dames & Moore Court rejected the claim that the federal govern-
ment had "taken" the plaintiff's prejudgment attachments against Ira-
nian assets by nullifying them.179  These attachments were "in every
sense subordinate to the President's power under the [International
Emergency Economic Powers Act]."' 80 As one commentator has ex-
pressed, "businesses conducting trade with foreign countries should not
rely on the availability of foreign-owned assets in the United States, be-
cause in times of trouble those assets would become bargaining chips in a
game of diplomatic poker."' 1  Thus, the Dames & Moore Court
subordinated the Takings Clause to the President's constitutional power
to conduct foreign policy." 2
D. The Takings Clause, the Commerce Clause, and Railroads
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has regulated railroads for
over 100 years.18 3 Rate-setting has served as a major form of regula-
tion. 4 Congressional regulation has substantially affected the use of
railroad property.1 5 For example, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion "has plenary authority to regulate, in the interest of interstate com-
merce, rail carriers' cessation of service on their lines. And at least as to
abandonments, this authority is exclusive."' 86 These and other forms of
government regulation share the common theme of maintaining the in-
tegrity of the nation's rail transportation system, a goal that legitimately
falls under the Commerce Clause.'1 7 Under the Court's takings formulae
which address zoning and uncertain property interests, preserving rail-
177. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979) (Commerce Clause em-
braces "a wide spectrum of economic activities").
178. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
179. Id at 674 n.6.
180. Id The International Emergency Economic Powers Act appears at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1706 (1988).
181. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 612 (2d ed. 1988).
182. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
183. See Hovenkamp, supra note 117.
184. Id
185. See, eg., Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 351, 368-69 (1915) (no taking
occurred where government ordered railroad to stop refusing to interchange cars with a con-
necting carrier).
186. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 323 (1981).
187. Congressional policy has expressed this goal repeatedly. For example, certificates of
railroad abandonment issue "not primarily to protect the railroad, but to protect interstate
commerce from undue burdens or discrimination." Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153,
162 (1926). Similarly, in enacting the Trails Act, Congress intended to further "the national
policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service [and]
to protect rail transportation corridors.. ." 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988).
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road rights-of-way cannot give rise to a valid takings claim because the
contravening commerce clause interest in transportation outweighs the
alleged property interest. Nor does a taking arise under the Court's "per
se" formula, which does not require a balancing of property and com-
merce clause interests.
IV. Suggested Modifications to the Preservation Statute
If Congress may preserve railroad rights-of-way without landown-
ers' consent, it should do so directly. The present system calls for a
three-party agreement among the railroad, the ICC, and a private or
public trail operator. Under the proposed agreement: (1) the railroad
would allow the right-of-way to be used as a trail, (2) the ICC would
refrain from listing the line as abandoned, and (3) the operator would
assume tax and tort liability for the right-of-way. 188 The present system
is problematic because it may give rise to a valid takings claim by a land-
owner who has a reversionary interest in the right-of-way. As Justice
O'Connor recently wrote, "[t]he ICC may possess the power to postpone
enjoyment of reversionary interests, but the Fifth Amendment and well-
established doctrine indicate that in certain circumstances the Govern-
ment must compensate owners of those property interests when it exer-
cises that power."' 89 Because a central interest of Congress is to preserve
railroad routes,"9 Congress should concentrate on doing so simply by
prohibiting landowners from using the rights-of-way in a manner that
impedes their future use for transportation. Trail use plainly does not
merit the protection available to right-of-way preservation because trail
use is not the kind of interstate commerce which Congress seeks to pre-
serve under the Trails Act. Trail use, though important in its own right,
gives rise to its own takings problems, particularly under the Court's
"per se" analysis.' 91 These takings problems should be addressed at the
local level.' 92
188. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988). A detailed discussion of the relevant regulations appears
in Rail Abandonments-Use of Rights-of-Way as Trails, 2 I.C.C.2d 591, 602-13 (1986).
189. See Preseault v. I.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 914, 926-28 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988), which administers the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act [RRRRA], 45 U.S.C. §§ 801-855. One purpose of the RRRRA is to
maintain the physical facilities of the railroad system of the United States. Id., § 801(a).
191. See Preseault, 110 S. Ct. at 926-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring), which applies Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 428 U.S. 825 (1987), to reach the conclusion "that a taking would
occur if the Government appropriated a public easement." Preseault, 110 S. Ct. at 928
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The concurring opinion also cites Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979), for the proposition that trail use, at least where it holds up reversions,
impinges on "'[t]he right to exclude' . . . universally held to be a fundamental element of the
property right." Preseault, 110 S. Ct. at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S. at 179).
192. That is, since trail use is for the local benefit, it should not burden the federal govern-
ment by way of takings claims. Local governments are better equipped to weigh the benefits
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V. Conclusion
Preserving railroad rights-of-way not only falls within Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause but also does so without giving
rise to takings claims. 193 This statement denotes a prioritization of the
Commerce Clause over the Takings Clause when the preservation of rail-
road rights-of-way is concerned. The preeminence of the Commerce
Clause finds expression either as an analog to the "navigation servitude"
or in the context of a conventional takings clause analysis. 194
Railroad rights-of-way, which were the subject of federal land
grants, require a different analysis. The federal government made the
grants with the implied condition that the national transportation needs
would continue to be met. This condition prevents disposition of rights-
of-way in manners inconsistent with the national transportation policy.
Under any of the three theories presented, 195 the result is the same: Con-
gress may-and should-preserve vital railroad routes by imposing use
restrictions on them. Congress should not try to preserve railroad rights-
of-way by permitting intervening trail use, which presents takings
problems of its own.
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and burdens of trail use. They would have incentive to do so if the financial burdens of trail
use were felt at the local level.
193. See supra notes 22-187 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 39-187 and accompanying text.
195. The three theories are implied conditions in federal land grants (Part I of this Note),
an analog of the federal navigation servitude doctrine (Part II), and conventional fifth amend-
ment takings formulae (Part III).
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